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Abstract 
India – Solar Cells is one of a growing number of WTO disputes that highlight the continuing tensions 
between climate change polices (and renewable energy manufacturing initiatives in particular) and 
established multilateral trading rules. The United States alleged that Indian policies discriminated 
against foreign solar cell suppliers operating in the Indian market. The Appellate Body broadly 
rejected India’s arguments to justify the measure either under Article III.8 public procurement 
derogations or as a general exception under “short supply” and “compliance with laws and 
regulations” provision of Article XX of the GATT. We argue that the Appellate Body was correct both 
on legal and economic grounds. The case does highlight the continuing need for clarity about the 
allowed parameters for climate change policies within the multilateral trade system. 
Keywords 
Clean energy trade policy, solar energy,  WTO general exceptions. 
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I. Introduction  
The WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) India-Solar Cells1 report is seemingly a straightforward assessment 
of whether India could invoke government procurement derogations under Article III of the GATT to 
impose domestic content requirements (DCR) on inputs purchased by private companies that 
subsequently contracted to sell electricity to the Indian government. The United States alleged that 
these policies discriminated against foreign suppliers operating in India. The AB broadly rejected 
India’s arguments under Article III as well as its appeals to exceptions under the GATT’s Article XX 
“short supply” and “compliance with laws and regulations” provisions. 
However, other issues also arise in this case that are more important to the broader international 
system. Perhaps most critically, India-Solar Cells is one of a growing number of WTO disputes to 
highlight continued economic and legal tensions between climate change polices (and renewable 
energy manufacturing initiatives in particular) and multilateral trading rules. This tension arises 
because the products at the heart of the dispute are photovoltaic solar cells and modules (PVCM).  
Economically efficient and WTO consistent policy choices are quite complicated in this context 
given a number of possible “externalities.” Pure free market outcomes are unlikely to deal with these 
problems. Yet the question remains: What are appropriate policies? The Indian government DCR 
provisions for PVCMs were undertaken with the explicit goals of: increasing renewable energy 
capacity for sustainable development; expanding electricity access to alleviate poverty; and fulfilling 
international climate change commitments. The dispute also highlights ongoing efforts around the 
world to use various public policy interventions to establish a strong presence in renewable energy 
manufacturing sectors; India is certainly not alone in intervening to help a domestic solar 
manufacturing industry. The policies also fit into India’s long-standing efforts to promote domestic 
manufacturing. The essential policy question is whether banning imports of certain types of solar cells 
and panels as India did in this case is the best approach given this complicated matrix of policy goals.  
The case also illustrates the difficulties surrounding WTO-legal policy options on climate change. 
This is the first time that general exceptions under Article XX (d) and (j) of the GATT have been 
assessed by the AB in the context of climate-relevant policies of a member government. While India’s 
policies were considered discriminatory in the current case, the AB’s response to India’s claims hints 
about possible future uses of Article XX exceptions based on climate goals. In particular, the AB 
adopts a wider interpretation than in previous case law of Article XX (d) on compliance with laws and 
regulations not inconsistent with GATT, thus perhaps opening the way for future defenses on the basis 
of international environmental obligations.  
India-Solar Cells specifically involves policies announced by the Indian government in 2010. The 
stated objective was to “establish India as a global leader in solar energy, by creating the policy 
conditions for its diffusion across the country as quickly as possible” (§1.2 of AB report). But the 
policy reflects longer standing broad ambitions in the context of the Indian government’s 2008 
National Action Plan on Climate Change to: a) “sustain rapid economic growth while dealing with the 
global threat of climate change;” while b) recognizing “the overriding priority of economic and social 
development and poverty eradication.” (Government of India, 2008, 1).  
The Obama Administration supported Indian’s broad renewable energy objectives but argued that 
discriminatory policies can have a counterproductive effect for clean energy. The issue, according to 
the United States, was not the goal of the policy but the mechanisms used. The U.S. Trade 
Representative issued a public statement after the India-Solar Cells panel was launched, noting that:  
                                                     
1
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“the United States strongly supports the rapid deployment of solar energy around the world, 
including with India. Unfortunately, India’s discriminatory policies in its national solar program 
detract from that successful cooperation, raise the cost of clean energy, and undermine progress 
toward our shared objective.” (USTR, 2013)  
India-Solar Cells marks what may be a first step of a broader and continuing dispute between the 
United States and India on solar energy. Only a few days before the AB issued its final India – Solar 
Cells report, India initiated what may be a tit-for-tat dispute involving a number of U.S. state-level 
incentives that allegedly favored domestic over imported renewable energy sector firms (including 
solar module producers), including local content requirements. A WTO Panel was established on 21 
March 2017 to examine these U.S. policies.
2
  
International trade disputes involving solar power specifically, and renewable energy more 
generally, are becoming more common, often involving the same countries and similar products.
 
There 
are also many antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard measures in the PVCM sector 
including: an Indian antidumping case on PVCMs brought against the United States, China, Malaysia, 
and Taiwan in 2012; Chinese antidumping and countervailing duty cases on a PVCM intermediate 
input brought against the United States in 2012; and a U.S. safeguard petition for PVCMs in 2017. 
There also have been cases targeting silicon metal, which is an upstream input used both for solar cells 
and semiconductors.
3
  
India-Solar Panels is most closely related to Canada-Feed in Tariffs, which also involved domestic 
content requirements for renewable energy products. Charnovitz and Fischer (2015) provide an 
analysis of this case in which Canada was found in violation of the GATT and the Agreement on 
Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). In the current case, India policies also were deemed 
inconsistent with its WTO obligations, and where applicable, the reasoning of Canada – Renewable 
Energy was used almost identically.  
A notable difference between the two cases is the absence of arguments in India – Solar Cells 
based on the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”). This 
is surprising given that the United States had identified Articles 4, 7 and 30 of the SCM as a basis for 
its complaint in its initial consultation request.
4
 However, the United States did not raise these claims 
in its request for establishment of a Panel.
5
 Given the confidential nature of consultations, one may 
only speculate why the United States dropped this line of argumentation. It is likely that the AB report 
of Canada – Feed in Tariffs (issued after the request for consultations and before the establishment of 
the Panel) had an impact on the U.S. decision. Indeed, the AB’s new analysis on the existence of a 
subsidy (particularly the need to establish the existence of a benefit) is more complex, thus potentially 
discouraging the United States from embarking on this route (Charnovitz and Fischer, 2015 and 
Rubini and Cosbey, 2017). More broadly, this may suggest an unwillingness by WTO Members to 
undertake claims under the SCM Agreement because of a fear of creating a precedence on green 
energy subsidies that could result in a wide range of counter-claims (Rubini, 2014). 
The AB has avoided taking an explicit stance on renewable energy per se in these cases and instead 
has remained focused on the technicalities of the different arguments despite the need for clear 
disciplines on this subject. A myriad of requests for consultation raised in the past years concerning 
renewable energy may force the AB to take a clearer stance on renewable energy goods in the near 
future.
6
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The rest of the paper provides legal and economic perspectives on the AB India - Solar Cells 
report. Section 2 summarizes the Indian measure challenged by the U.S., the Panel ruling, arguments 
on appeal and the Appellate Body report. Section 3 includes an evaluation of the legal and economic 
issues surrounding the dispute with particular focus on the tension between trade and environmental 
considerations.  
2. Summary of Case and Arguments 
2.1 Facts  
The Indian government launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (NSM) in 2010. Under 
the NSM, the government concluded power purchase agreements (PPA) with private solar power 
developers (SPDs) and guaranteed to purchase electricity from them at a certain rate for a 25-year 
term. The Indian government then resold the purchased electricity to downstream distribution 
companies, which in turn sold electricity to final consumers. These agreements placed increasingly 
stringent DCRs for solar cells and modules as part of the PPAs. Only solar power generators selling to 
the Indian government under these agreements were subject to the DCRs. 
The production chain for solar energy production and distribution has the following steps. Silicon 
metal is processed to form polysilicon ingots, which subsequently is transformed into wafers and then 
solar cells. These cells are then combined into a “solar module,” which in turn typically is installed on 
a rooftop or large-scale industrial applications to produce electricity. This electricity is then distributed 
to final consumers. Consequently, the Indian DCRs were applied to only a particular part of the overall 
solar energy process.  
Three types of photovoltaic technology are relevant in this discussion: 1) crystalline silicon (c-Si) 
cells, which is by far the most common type; 2) “thin film” cells, which are cheaper but less efficient 
than c-Si; and 3) “concentrator cells,” which are used in conjunction with curved surfaces that focus 
sunlight.  
The NSM domestic content requirements were phased in over time: 
 Phase 1, Batch 1 (2010-2013): all SPDs using c-Si technologies must buy c-Si modules from 
Indian manufacturers; use of foreign c-Si cells and foreign thin-film modules or concentrator cells 
allowed; 
 Phase 1, Batch 2 (2013-2017): all projects using c-Si technology must use c-Si cells and modules 
manufactured in India; use of domestic or foreign produced modules using thin-film modules or 
concentrator cells allowed; 
 Phase II (2017-2022): all solar cells and modules must be made in India regardless of technology 
used. 
The Indian government DCRs therefore were in the upstream part of the solar generation process. The 
DCRs vary over time with specificity, presumably aimed to allow Indian manufacturers to ramp up 
capacity in the different technologies with increasingly restrictive DCRs. 
The United States, worried in particular that the DCRs would extend ultimately to thin film 
technologies that represent a majority of U.S. solar exports to India, launched a request for 
consultations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism on 6 February 2013. The United States 
argued that the DCR measures adopted under the NSM discriminated against foreign suppliers and 
thus violated the GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. After bilateral consultations 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Measures On the Importation and Marketing of Biodiesel and Measures Supporting the Biodiesel Industry WT/DS459/1; 
Request for Consultations by China, European Union and Certain Member States – Certain Measures Affecting the 
Renewable Energy Generation Sector WT/DS452/1. 
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failed to reach an understanding, a Panel was established on 23 May 2014. The Panel’s report was 
issued on 24 February 2016. The Indian government subsequently filed an appeal on various aspects 
of the Panel’s decision (discussed in more detail below). The Appellate Body circulated its report on 
16 September 2016. 
2.2 Panel Ruling, Arguments in Appeal, and AB Ruling 
The Panel found that India had violated national treatment obligations of Article 2.1 of the TRIMS 
Agreement and Article III.4 of the GATT 1994. Furthermore, it rejected India’s arguments that the 
DCR measures were covered by the government procurement derogation of Article III.8 of the GATT 
(“Article III.8”), justified by general exceptions of short supply under Article XX (j) of the GATT 
(“Article XX (j)”), or needed to ensure compliance with laws and regulations under Article XX (d) of 
the GATT (“Article XX (d)”). India appealed the decision on the grounds that the Panel had erred in 
its interpretation of these GATT provisions.  
2.2.1. Art III.8 - Government Procurement Derogation from National Treatment  
India argued that its DCR measures were covered by the national treatment derogation provisions of 
Article III.8. To evaluate this argument, the Panel examined whether the discriminatory treatment 
existed between the products subject to discrimination (imported PVCMs) and products directly 
procured by the Indian government (solar electricity purchased under a PPA). Relying heavily on the 
AB’s analysis in Canada – Renewable Energy, the Panel found that the DCR measures were not 
covered by the derogation because the Indian government purchases electricity whereas the DCR 
discrimination relates to solar cells and modules that are used to produce electricity. In essence, 
upstream inputs (PVCMs bought by private solar power generating firms) were not considered 
procured by the government (even indirectly) in its purchase of the downstream output (electricity). 
India on appeal argued that the Panel had “mechanically” applied the Appellate Body’s test of a 
competitive relationship developed in Canada – Renewable Energy and had not assessed all of India’s 
arguments, most notably that PVCMs are “indistinguishable” from solar power generation.  
The AB determined that the Panel was well in its rights not to consider arguments it deemed not 
pertinent for the ruling and was correct in its analysis concerning Article III.8. It reiterated its position 
in Canada – Feed in Tariff that the government procurement carve-out required that foreign product 
must be directly competitive with, or substitutable for, the procured product. The AB therefore 
dismissed India’s argument about the necessity of examining whether PVCMs constituted necessary 
inputs for solar power generation and concluded that the character of “input” would only “inform” the 
determination of a competitive relationship. 
2.2.2 Article XX (j) - General Exception for Products in General or Local Short Supply  
India argued that if its Article III.8 derogation arguments were rejected, the measures could be 
justified instead under the general exception of Article XX (j) because they qualified as measures 
“essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply.” India 
maintained that PVCMs were in “short supply” because India lacked sufficient domestic 
manufacturing capacity of these products. Moreover, India asserted that the DCR measures were 
essential to redress the short supply situation because of the policy goals of energy security and 
sustainable growth required indigenously manufactured solar cells and modules (§5.46 of AB Report).  
The Panel rejected India’s claims and found that the provisions of Article XX (j) did not entitle all 
Members to an equitable share in the international production of the relevant product but instead 
referred to “an equitable share of the international supply of the product.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, 
the Panel considered that potential risks of import disruption was not the situation of short supply 
India – Solar Cells: Trade Rules, Climate Policy, and Sustainable Development Goals 
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implied by Article XX (j) because the Article makes reference only to imminent risks of shortage. In 
its appeal, India claimed that the Panel had erred in making a restrictive interpretation of Article XX 
(j) and reiterated that “general or local short supply shortages” exist simply in the presence of low 
domestic manufacturing capacity. 
This is the first time that Article XX (j) has been interpreted by the WTO DSM and therefore 
helped clarify the exceptions’ scope. The AB recalled the two-step analysis applicable: 1) whether the 
measure is justified under a specific paragraph of Article XX; and 2) whether the measure is consistent 
with the chapeau of Article XX, i.e. the measures do not reflect arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination. For Article XX (j), the AB specified that a measure needed first to be proven to be 
“designed to address the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply” and 
second that they are “essential” to address the situation of short supply.  
The AB confirmed the Panel’s finding that India’s lack of domestic manufacturing capacity was 
not sufficient to constitute product shortage and agreed that India merely identified potential 
disruptions to imports and failed to demonstrate that the SPDs had experienced any actual disruptions. 
Finally, the AB rejected India’s claim that the objectives of energy security and sustainable growth 
make the DCR measures “essential” to the acquisition of solar cells and modules. Although these 
societal interests or values objectives can indeed inform the evaluation of the essential character of a 
measure, they do not provide evidence on the lack of supply.  
2.2.3 Article XX(d): General Exception for Necessary Compliance with Laws and Regulations 
India also maintained that the DCR measures were necessary to secure compliance with “laws and 
regulations” as understood by Article XX (d). India argued that the DCR measures ensure compliance 
with four different Indian policies and four international instruments including the Preamble of WTO 
Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992, and the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution on “The Future We Want.”  
The Panel excluded the international instruments from the scope of “laws and regulations” as 
understood by Article XX (j) because they do not have “direct effect” in India. It further considered 
that the domestic instruments did not include the “existence of any legally enforceable rule” and 
instead were “hortatory, aspirational, declaratory, and at times solely descriptive.” The Panel did find 
that a fourth Act invoked by India constituted a law for the purpose of Article XX (d), but did not 
consider that the DCR measures “secured compliance” (i.e. enforced obligations) under that particular 
act.  
India claimed on appeal that the four domestic policy instruments were laws within the meaning of 
Article XX (d) because the Indian legal system comprised “both ‘binding’ laws, and policies and 
plans, that provide the ‘framework for executive action,’” and that the DCR measures secured 
compliance to these Indian measures. In addition, India maintained that the four international 
instruments had direct effect in India and thus required compliance measures to be taken by the 
executive branch. 
The AB rejected these Indian claims and confirmed its previous case law that “laws and 
regulations” refer exclusively to rules that are officially integrated into the domestic legal system of a 
WTO Member (§5.106 of AB report). Nevertheless, it underlined the diversity of ways in which 
international obligations could form part of domestic legal systems. In addition, it listed criteria to 
identify whether measures fall under the scope of “laws and regulations” of Article XX (d), focusing 
more on the relevant instrument’s formal characteristics than on the instrument’s source. General 
statements in international agreements about the need to combat climate change clearly will not be 
sufficient alone to satisfy the AB without explicit domestic implementation of those objectives, but 
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specific normative obligations resulting from international commitments could be, depending on each 
Members’ legal system. 
2.2.4 An Appellate Body Member’s Separate Opinion  
A rare separate opinion by one AB Member does not dispute the report’s final outcome or reasoning 
but is nonetheless notable. Only six separate opinions have been made by AB Members since the 
WTO’s founding in 1995 (See Lewis 2012, Flett 2010). This separate opinion also reflects the political 
tension surrounding the Unites States’ opposition to Mr. Seung Wha Chang’s reappointment as 
Appellate Body Member, who helped decide India-Solar Cells.  
The United States had opposed Mr. Chang’s reappointment and claimed he had been involved in 
cases where the WTO DSB had not confined itself strictly to securing a positive solution to a dispute. 
The United States noted that “…it is not the role of panels or the Appellate Body to ‘make law’ 
outside the context of resolving a dispute” (WTO, 2016, 3). The separate opinion acknowledges that 
the AB cannot offer interpretative guidance beyond the scope required for a particular dispute but 
notes the importance of making sufficiently precise recommendations and rulings to ensure disputes 
effective resolution to all Members’ benefit. (§5.161-162 of AB report). Mr. Chang made a similar 
point in his farewell speech from AB membership (Chang 2016, 2).  
Mr. Chang’s last case was India – Solar Cells heard before his AB retirement due to U.S. 
opposition to his reappointment. As noted throughout this paper, the AB was particularly cautious in 
this case to avoid questions going beyond the claims of the parties. The separate opinion suggests that 
Mr. Chang wished to reiterate the AB’s commitment to remain within its mandate and functions and 
seized the opportunity to leave a record of his position within the corpus of WTO case law.  
3. Key Legal and Economic Issues 
We turn now to analyze whether the AB’s reasoning was appropriate given the facts of the case, past 
precedent, and relevant economic trends. 
3.1 Solar Cells as Inputs 
A critical part of India’s argument for an Article III.8 derogation was that the government was 
indirectly purchasing solar cells and modules when it directly contracted for electricity generated 
specifically by solar power. In essence, India argued that stipulations on the purchase of domestic 
inputs for government contractors was covered by Article III.8. The United States responded by 
proposing that solar cells and modules were not inputs since they are not consumed during the 
production of solar energy. The AB declined to rule on India’s position on inputs since they reasoned 
that the finding of a non-competitive relationship between PVCM purchases and solar energy 
generation meant that a necessary initial criterion for a derogation was not met.  
There are two issues for analysis here.  
The first is a legal argument about whether the AB should have considered whether the PVCMs 
were indeed covered by the government procurement derogation as inputs of the solar energy 
purchased by the Indian government.  
The effect of inputs in the national treatment obligation is important first because it is a key 
argument of India and because it may have important consequences for WTO Members future 
environmental policies.  
Inputs are not explicitly mentioned by Article III and have not yet been defined by case law. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that they form an integral part of the end product that is in a competitive 
India – Solar Cells: Trade Rules, Climate Policy, and Sustainable Development Goals 
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relationship with a product subject to discrimination, they may serve as an important factor in 
determining the presence of discrimination. Nevertheless, inputs are not directly assessed as part of the 
“likeness” test that considers physical properties and characteristics, consumer preferences, product 
end-uses, and tariff classification.  
In the current dispute, the AB upheld the Panel’s finding that the scope of the national treatment 
derogation must be the same as the scope of the national treatment obligation itself. It therefore 
focused on the examination of the “likeness” between the product purchased (electricity generated by 
solar cells and modules) and the product subject to discrimination (solar cells and modules), 
comparing them both as end products.  
The AB did not evaluate whether PVCMs were inputs due to India’s claims in appeal, which asked 
the AB to consider inputs beyond the “competitive relationship” test. In response, the AB highlighted 
that the consideration of inputs did not displace the criteria of a competitive relationship (§5.24 of AB 
report). Indeed, as a derogation to the national treatment obligation, it seems most reasonable that 
Article III.8(a) must share the same scope as the obligation itself, as the AB stated in Canada – 
Renewable Energy (§5.63 of AB Report).  
The AB thus missed the opportunity to take a strong stance on the consideration of inputs and 
processes of production.
7
 Given that the dispute raises questions on the WTO adjudicator’s “objective 
assessment,” the AB may be particularly wary of any perception about it overstepping its mandate. 
The AB did however recognize that the assessment of inputs can be relevant, in two respects: both to 
inform the evaluation of “likeness” and to determine the existence of discrimination (§5.40 of AB 
report). Such an acknowledgement might open a door for regulators to treat products differently 
depending on input’s characteristics, potentially even beyond questions about Article III.8 derogations.  
The second issue is an evaluation of India’s core economic argument that India about the status of 
PVCMs as indispensable inputs for solar electricity production. A related issue is the United States’ 
contention that PVCMs are not inputs at all.  
This second set of questions is relatively straightforward to evaluate. Any reasonable economic 
definition would include solar cells and modules as production inputs for solar energy. For example, a 
neoclassical production function typically includes labor and capital. One might argue that PVCMs are 
not a variable input but instead are a fixed input, in particular, a piece of capital equipment. But from 
an economics standpoint, India’s argument that without solar cells and modules there is no solar 
generated electricity would seem to be a sound one. One might imagine that technological advances 
may change how energy emitted from the sun is converted into useable electricity but under any 
current technical methods, solar cells (be they c-Si or thin film or concentrator cells) remain a central 
aspect of solar electrical power generation.  
This analysis does not address whether it is economically efficient to allow for such a derogation 
but there are sound economic reasons for India to make this claim and few arguments in favor of the 
United States’ position. For example, the NSM required all solar electricity generated under a power 
purchasing agreement to use Indian solar cells and modules beyond Phase II (i.e. post 2017). 
Technological advances abroad may not be available to Indian solar producers under such a domestic 
content requirement resulting in higher costs and/or lower productivity. The Indian approach certainly 
puts the Indian solar producers in a potentially precarious spot if domestic supplies were to become 
obsolete or subject to disruption themselves. 
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3.2 Criteria for Short Supply Exception 
We turn next to India’s position that if the Article III derogation was found without merit, then an 
Article XX (j) exception for the DCR would apply.  
As noted above, the AB had not previously interpreted Article XX (j) so that India-Solar Cells is 
especially important to clarify this exception’s use.  
This provision was originally envisaged “to permit, during the post-war transitional period, the use 
of differential internal taxes and internal mixing regulations as well as quantitative restrictions in order 
to distribute goods in short supply, to give effect to price controls based on shortages and to liquidate 
surplus stocks or uneconomic industries carried over from the war period.”8 The drafters included the 
language even after the transitional post war period, envisaging situations such as natural disasters.
9
 
The AB leaves open the possibility in India-Solar Cells that the short supply exception could be used 
beyond extreme cases of shortage due to wartime or natural disasters, as long as there is actual or 
imminent risk of shortage.  
The AB described the legal standard applicable to the Article XX (j) exception based on 
established case law on other provisions of Article XX. It distinguishes the analysis of the measure 
itself from the analysis of the relationship between the measure and the pursued objective. If the 
former is not established, the AB argues there is no need to examine the latter.  
3.2.1 Measures Designed to Address Shortage 
The AB determined that a measure under Article XX (j) must be designed to address the acquisition or 
distribution of products in general or local short supply. This implies that there are products in short 
supply and that the measure is capable of addressing the acquisition or distribution of products in 
general or local short supply.  
The AB makes the “availability” of products for purchase the key criteria in establishing the 
presence of products in short supply. It notes that this availability must be established on a case-by-
case basis, but gives a list of elements that may be taken into account to determine the availability of 
supply. (See §5.71 of AB Report.)  
The AB determined that India did not sufficiently establish that there was a short supply of Indian 
PVCMs but it did recognize the possibility to consider the lack of manufacturing capacity and 
potential risks of disruption in estimating the existence of short supply. In particular, it considered that 
the lack of manufacturing capacity can lead to short supply but does not necessarily establish short 
supply as argued by India. The AB also held that potential risks of disruption may inform the 
consideration of short supply but do not amount alone to evidence towards actual disruptions to 
imports in PVCMs. An actual disruption in supply must still be established for Article XX (j) to be 
applicable. In particular, the text requires that the measures cease once “conditions giving rise to them 
have ceased to exist.” This suggests that the short supply must be a current fact; arguments about 
possible shortages in the future seem to lie outside this general exception’s scope. 
Although the AB rejected that a potential disruption in imports would justify the Indian DCR, it 
does consider that specific vulnerabilities to disruptions faced by developing countries should be taken 
into account for a short supply exception. Indeed, it notes that “different levels of economic 
development of Members may, depending on the circumstances, impact the availability of supply of a 
product in a given market” (§5.72 of AB Report). The AB therefore leaves space for broader 
applicability of the exception of short supply to developing countries.  
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3.2.2 Relationship Between Measure and Pursued Objective: “Essential” 
A measure’s relationship to a pursued policy objective is a crucial factor in analyzing a domestic 
regulation’s WTO legality. The AB underlines that there is a distinction between exceptions that apply 
the criteria of “indispensable,” “making a contribution to,” or “necessary,” inter alia. The AB 
recognizes that “weighing and balancing” different factors for the “essential” character of the measure 
may be different than for exceptions using the term “necessary.” Nevertheless, the AB’s balancing test 
for “essential” in India-Solar Cells is not fundamentally different from earlier assessments of 
“necessity.” The AB does recall the requirement to apply the least restrictive alternative reasonably 
available applied in interpretations of Articles XX (a), (b) and (d). It mentions among the balancing 
factors a comparison of the measure at stake with reasonably available alternative measures but does 
not discuss less restrictive alternatives.  
Having already rejected India’s short supply argument, the AB missed the opportunity to analyze 
the relationship between the Indian DCR measure and its pursued objectives so did not clarify the 
meaning of “essential” as understood by Article XX (j).  
3.2.3 Economic Perspectives on India’s Short Supply Argument 
The AB ruled that the lack of domestic manufacturing capability was not a sufficient argument for 
invoking the Article XX (j) short supply exception. When might such a “short supply” exception make 
economic sense? What does the data suggest about the broader vulnerabilities that India might face if 
it relied heavily on imported PVCMs? 
One might imagine that WTO members might want to intervene in trade for a product for which 
market conditions are subject to various kinds of uncertainty. The essential question is what type of 
intervention would address the underlying risk with acceptable unintended consequences. 
For example, a country might want to restrict exports of an essential food product or critical 
intermediate manufacturing input because of domestic or international market disruptions. Exporting a 
good in such circumstances would result in higher prices and potential difficulties for consumers. 
Economists would normally argue that higher prices would be an appropriate market signal to induce 
national or international firms to supply more to the domestic market. Indeed, this is an essential 
function of allocative efficiency associated with markets. Complete reliance on imports for an 
essential food or critical manufactured good might also suggest some type of intervention. But which 
intervention is most appropriate? 
A threshold issue is whether there are any reasonable indications that international trade of PVCMs 
has been disrupted in the past or likely to be disrupted in the future. Without such a disruption, there 
are few reasons to insist on a domestic production presence to insure against possible supply problems.  
One can look at three sets of data to evaluate whether there have been any recent disruptions in the 
market for solar cells and modules: 1) global production and trade patterns; 2) imports into India 
specifically; and 3) international prices. We will see below that recent trends point towards a growing 
market of PVCMs, increased trade, and falling prices, with little evidence of disruptions.  
International Energy Agency data shows a dramatic increase in installed global solar electrical 
generation capacity in recent years from an estimated 0.6 gigawatts of capacity in 2000 to 5.6 
gigawatts in 2006 to 303 gigawatts in 2016 (IEA, 2017). Perhaps most importantly, this installed 
capacity has increased in every year from 2000 to 2017.  
Global trade data also suggest a relatively stable market for the photovoltaic cell industry. UN 
Comtrade (2017) data for Harmonized System code 854140 shows that between 2007 and 2016 global 
exports of PVCMs doubled from US$23.2 billion to US$47.7 billion. There was a drop in trade 
following 2011 but this was likely a result of the following effects: 1) the fall in fossil fuel prices; 2) 
reduction in domestic subsidies for solar energy such as feed-in-tariffs for countries such as Germany 
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and Spain; 3) increased installation of domestic solar energy across the world, thereby diverting at 
least some supply to internal use; and 4) increased use of PVCM trade remedies that limit trade flows.  
It is important to look at India’s own experience with international trade in PVCMs. Figures 1 and 
2 below are based on Indian government trade data, which do not correspond exactly to UN data since 
it is not reported on a calendar year basis. Figure 1 shows that Indian imports of photovoltaic cells 
have increased dramatically over the last decade. There was a drop that was coincident with the NSM 
becoming more restrictive in Phase I, Batch 2 in 2013 but imports have recently increased to 
unprecedented values, due mainly to imports from China. It is also important to remember that the 
DCRs applied only to projects involving SPDS selling to the Indian government; imports of PVCMs 
could enter India with no DCRs for all electricity not bought under government PPAs. Figure 2 shows 
that U.S. PVCM exports to India fell dramatically in 2013 and have not recovered. This reflects U.S. 
concerns about the impact of the DCRs but also reflects the reordering of this manufacturing sector by 
the rise of China.  
Recent price data also belie concerns about any recent international trade disruptions. Figure 3 
shows spot prices on crystalline modules in China and Germany, which are two benchmark markets 
for PVCMs. These falling prices reflect a number of economic factors. There are important economies 
of scale in solar cell production; high fixed costs are required to set up the production facilities. These 
high fixed costs are then spread across larger production runs so that average costs are falling. U.S. 
government reports suggest that lower prices for polysilicon ingots, a key component for the 
production of traditional solar cells and modules, fell by about 75 percent from early 2011 to 2013 and 
remained relatively flat since then (USITC, 2015). Finally, overcapacity likely has been encouraged by 
government direct or indirect subsidies for solar cell manufacturing. The effects of the subsidies 
themselves can possibly lead to countervailing duty cases if the resulting exports result in material 
injury to solar component manufacturers in importing countries. In addition, high fixed cost industries 
may continue to export at prices below average total costs in order to cover at least some of the fixed 
costs. Perhaps not surprisingly, there has been a market shakeout as many solar cell producers have 
declared bankruptcy across the world; overall global production has nevertheless continued to 
increase.  
In short, there is strong evidence that the world solar cell and module industry has not been subject 
to global supply disruptions in recent years. From an economic standpoint, the AB made the correct 
decision in disallowing invocation of the short supply provisions of Article XX. Allowing India to 
avoid basic obligations such as national treatment based on such a slim reed of argumentation would 
be very problematic for the multilateral system. Indeed, the solar industry has been characterized, not 
by shortages, but instead by increased capacity and falling prices. Such price dynamics often lead to a 
plethora of trade remedy cases such as in the steel industry over the last few decades. In this sense, the 
PVCM manufacturing sector is following a standard pattern for high fixed costs industries that have 
become particularly favored by governments around the world and that are subject to trade remedy 
cases as the industries mature.  
A potential approach would be for India to take this opportunity to import PVCMs at current low 
prices in order to expand sustainable electricity production across the country. This would have 
important advantages for India’s stated goal of sustainable economic development to help lower 
poverty and with an eye towards climate change concerns. Indeed, the data discussed above suggests 
that India as a whole has seen a dramatic increase in solar cell imports even as it has tried to encourage 
a domestic solar manufacturing industry.  
The analysis above certainly suggests that there have not been past disruptions in the solar sector. 
But there has been relatively little experience with a global market for this product so perhaps there 
might be some disruption in the future. What might constitute an “insurance” policy against such 
potential import supply shocks? Options might include: 1) trade restrictions; 2) stockpiling of the 
imported good; or 3) domestic production subsidies. All three could ensure domestic supply in times 
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of disruptions but with varying degrees of economic disruption. The choice among these options can 
be guided by standard economic analysis of policy responses to managing risk.  
Direct trade restrictions (e.g. antidumping and countervailing duties) can be imposed under WTO 
rules but only under certain circumstances. Safeguards are also possible but also are subject to WTO 
rules and dispute review. An important aspect of all of these types of cases is that “short supply” 
simply is not associated with their use. Instead, domestic governments need to show current (or 
threatened) damage done to a domestic industry because of too many imports and not problems 
associated with too little supply from foreign sources. In addition, one clear disadvantage to such 
import restriction policies is that they result in higher prices for the good in question.  
It is interesting to note that the Indian Ministry of Finance declined to impose antidumping duties 
on imported solar cells and modules from China, the United States, Malaysia, and Taiwan in 2014 as 
recommended by the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Moreover, the very ambitious goals 
of the Indian government to increase the use of solar energy would be undercut by such duties, 
especially if there were insufficient domestic production capacity to meet the solar adoption targets. In 
addition, import restrictions would increase the costs of purchasing PVCMs for all consumers. 
A less costly approach than imposing import restrictions to guard against future supply disruptions 
would be to stockpile solar cells and modules. There are no restrictions on stockpiling under GATT 
rules. Thus, India could pursue this policy without violating international trade obligations.  
A useful analogy is to consider approaches in another energy source: petroleum. There certainly 
have been major disruptions in in petroleum markets in the past; such shocks could also occur in the 
future. For short-term disruptions, some countries have turned to emergency stocks, such as the U.S. 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which currently contains over 700 million barrels of oil (DOE, 2017). 
Petroleum has the advantage that it can be stored for long periods without degradation of the resource. 
Similarly, PVCMs would degrade only slowly over time and could be stored if there were real fears of 
a supply disruption. An Indian government truly worried about external trade shocks could certainly 
purchase large stocks of PVCMs, an approach particularly attractive given recent price developments 
in the relevant market. 
Long-term disruptions lasting years present greater difficulties. Many governments have 
encouraged development of their own domestic energy sources (but generally without domestic 
content requirements) for long-term supply stability. The arguments for direct government 
encouragement of domestic production of solar cell and module are less compelling. Petroleum is 
consumed in the process of its use so that months-long disruptions can be very problematic. PVCMs 
on the other hand are capital equipment with a long effective life. A supply disruption would need to 
continue for many, many years before causing serious difficulties with current energy production 
capabilities. The long shelf life of solar equipment makes the political use of export embargoes much 
less dangerous, which in turn makes them less likely. Stockpiling over long periods does have the 
disadvantage that this is a field with likely rapidly changing technologies; stored solar cells and 
modules might become relatively obsolete albeit still usable with current production infrastructure. 
From an economic perspective, domestic production subsidies for solar cells with no restrictions on 
imported sources also has important advantages. In a standard partial equilibrium setting, such 
subsidies would encourage domestic production but without the increase in prices associated with 
import restrictions. In addition, India’s role as an important market in the global exports of solar cells 
could mean a reduction in world prices as Indian international purchases fell. Such a policy 
recommendation has two important downsides: 1) Indian government outlays would increase with 
such a policy; 2) Indian domestic subsidies that lowered world prices might be subject to international 
scrutiny. This latter issue is especially relevant given the lack of policy space for “green” subsidies 
under current international norms.  
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4. Climate Change Policies vs. Trade Obligations 
Solar electricity production has taken on greater urgency in recent years because of climate change 
fears. WTO disputes that involve an evaluation (and even condemnation) of domestic policies towards 
encouraging clean energy therefore are potentially very controversial. Indeed, there have been long-
standing concerns about possible tensions between climate policies and multilateral trade rules 
including, for example, treating imports with higher carbon content differentially at the border. Some 
have argued that such carbon-intensive goods would not be “like” products with less carbon emitted 
during production; these “dirty” versions of the product would arguably not be subject to Article III 
non-discrimination. Others have noted that even if different products (or inputs) were subject to 
national treatment provisions of Article III, an Article XX environmental exception might be 
possible.
10
 In short, these arguments are analogous to those forwarded by India in the dispute 
discussed here.  
But there are important differences. In the current dispute, India utilizes a particularly onerous 
policy (eventual outright prohibition of foreign inputs for solar electricity purchased by the 
government) and invokes GATT provisions that are not directly about environmental protection. 
Although the AB rejected India’s arguments, the ruling leaves open the possibility to use these 
provisions to justify climate change policies in the future. 
Article XX exceptions leave Members autonomy to define their own public policy objectives as 
long as they do not abuse their prerogative and do not use them as disguised protectionist actions. 
Earlier cases have been examined under the provisions of protecting health (GATT Article XX (b)) 
and the protection of exhaustible natural resources (GATT Article (XX (g)), including endangered 
species.
11
 In contrast, India’s argument in India – Solar Cells invokes GATT Articles XX (j) and XX 
(d), i.e. “short supply,” and “compliance with laws and regulations” that could be used to justify a 
broad range of policy objectives, including measures pursuing environmental protection.  
GATT Article XX (j): Short Supply Exception for Renewable Energy Goods 
As discussed above, Article XX (j) justifies domestic measures otherwise inconsistent with WTO 
obligations if they are essential to address a situation of short supply. It is in the context of looking at 
the nexus between the trade-restrictive measure and the objective pursued that the AB takes into 
account “the relative importance of the societal interests or values that the measure is intended to 
protect” (§5.59 of AB Report). Nothing in the AB’s reasoning in the current dispute explicitly referred 
to the protection of supply of renewable energy as a “vital” social objective.”12 The weighing and 
balancing test of Article XX could be an avenue for the AB to recognize the vital character of 
addressing climate change in the future, provided that the parties raise this argument explicitly in a 
way that India did not in its argumentation. 
However, India’s argument that “insufficient” domestic production of a renewable energy input 
was grounds for invoking a general exception under Article XX is highly suspect. For example, there 
are many less intrusive methods to help increase the use of renewable energy that fall far short of 
discriminating against foreign suppliers. India’s overly broad appeal to global climate commitments 
undercut the possible appropriate use of Article XX (j). One might easily imagine many countries 
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abusing such an exception; simply invoking a laudable national priority (e.g. poverty reduction, 
regional economic development, battling unemployment) combined with “insufficient” domestic 
production surely would not be a recipe for a sustainable non-discriminatory multilateral trading 
system. The AB’s rejection of India’s arguments on GATT Article XX (j) was therefore important to 
prevent such future abuses.  
Article XX (d): Environmental Obligations as a “Laws and Regulations” Exception 
In allowing Members to justify their WTO-inconsistent measures to compliance with other “laws and 
regulations,” Article XX (d) could potentially provide coherence between WTO Members obligations 
under the WTO and in other fora. AB consideration of international environmental obligations through 
this exception could arguably allow for a better balance between trade and environment priorities. 
The WTO adjudicator’s position with regards to non-WTO obligations has long been uncertain 
(Mavroidis, 2012, 342). Article XX (d) was interpreted narrowly by Panels in the GATT era (c.f. 
Japan – Agricultural Products I; and EEC – Parts and Components), and the AB confirmed a narrow 
approach by excluding international obligations from the scope of the article
13
 (Mavroidis, 2016, 442 
et seq.). In the current case, the AB seems to acknowledge the possibility that non-WTO international 
obligations could justify domestic regulations under Article XX (d), without applying it to the current 
case. Doubt therefore remains as to the exception’s applicability to international instruments in the 
future. 
The AB recalled its Mexico – Soft Drinks position noting that “laws and regulations” cover only 
rules that form part of the domestic legal system. However, it goes further into explaining the rationale 
for excluding international obligations from the scope of “laws and regulations” by relying on the 
ordinary meaning of these terms, which essentially refer to domestic laws and regulations, as was 
suggested by Davey and Sapir (2009). In addition, the AB makes a timid step towards considering 
international obligations under the scope of Article XX (d) by highlighting the variety of means by 
which they can form part of the domestic legal system. It underlines that international agreements can 
“form part of the domestic legal system of a Member in at least two ways” (emphasis added, at §5.140 
of AB report). This covers agreements that have been incorporated into a domestic legal system or that 
have a “direct effect” within the domestic system. The AB added that “… there may well be other 
ways in which international instruments or rules can become part of that domestic legal system.” The 
AB therefore concluded that only a case-by-case analysis could determine whether international 
instruments form part of the domestic legal system, and most importantly that this analysis must be 
complemented by the same test for normativity and specificity of the rules at stake as it applies to 
domestic “laws and regulations.” Although these criteria may resemble those used in some legal 
systems to determine direct effect or the “self-executing” nature of international instruments 
(Klabbers, 2017, 323-324), they do offer more objective guidance for Panels in considering laws and 
regulations for the purpose of article XX(d). 
By imposing this case-by-case consideration of the normativity and specificity factors, the AB 
applies clearer criteria to identify the scope of laws and regulations: the domestic or international 
source of the instrument no longer appears as the determining factor. It therefore seems that if 
obligations contained in international instruments fulfill these factors and are part of the domestic legal 
system, they would be covered by the exception of Article XX (d). This would be the case particularly 
in “monist” legal systems – i.e. in which treaties become part of domestic law after they have been 
concluded in accordance with the constitution, without legislation (Aust, 2007, 183).  
Focusing on India’s claims on direct effect, the AB did not conduct as thorough an examination of 
the international instruments as it did for the domestic instruments. However, the obligations on which 
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India based its arguments were mainly broad objectives of sustainable development goals as well as 
commitments to adopt national and regional policies to mitigate climate change and address 
greenhouse gas emissions (§7.272 of AB report). The AB found that these do not seem to satisfy the 
“specificity” requirement set by the AB to describe “laws or regulations.” The AB saw these 
international instruments as more “aspirational” than “specific,” failing to comply with the AB’s 
standard of review set for Article XX (d). It is therefore very likely that even if the AB had conducted 
a more thorough analysis of the content of the instruments cited by India, it would have excluded them 
from the scope of the exception.  
There are also serious questions about whether an Article XX (d) exception would have helped 
India attain its primary policies. Recall that there are three distinct policy goals that India claims to be 
pursuing: 1) eradicating poverty by broadening the availability of electricity; 2) meeting international 
climate change commitments to reduce carbon emissions; and 3) expanding domestic production of 
solar energy manufacturing. Each of these issues arguably reflects various market externalities. The 
DCRs could help meet the third goal but would undercut the other two policy objectives by raising the 
price of solar cells and modules. The Appellate Body’s role is not to assess whether or not India’s 
goals are appropriate. In this particular instance, adhering to established multilateral rules of non-
discrimination likely would be helpful to India accomplishing the first two objectives. And given that 
India’s own National Action Plan on Climate Change noted above claims that the Indian government’s 
“overriding priority” is poverty eradication, the Appellate Body’s position not to allow this specific 
Article XX exception seems particularly fortuitous. 
5. Conclusion  
The rapid expansion of the number of renewable energy WTO disputes calls for a clear position of the 
AB with regard to climate change to ensure predictability of trade in renewable energy products in 
particular, as noted by Marhold (2013). The AB report in India – Solar cells did not offer an 
innovative position in this regard. Its reasoning on general exceptions under Article XX (j) and (d) 
does seem to open some possibilities for justifying environmental policies in the future, albeit very 
cautiously. The AB confirms that only domestic laws and regulations are covered by Article XX (d) 
but underlines that international obligations may form part of the domestic legal order in a variety of 
ways. Environmental policies essential to address short supply in renewable energy products may also 
be justified under Article XX (j). However, given that this reasoning is not applied to the current case, 
it is difficult to be certain about its application in the future.  
As mentioned in the introduction, India raised a dispute against the state-level domestic content 
requirements in the U.S. after lengthy discussions in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Committees.
14
 This could be because there is a tit-for-tat dispute between the two countries, which did 
not get solved by the WTO adjudicator’s reports and may therefore likely continue in various fora. It 
could also suggest that there are issues regarding renewable energy and WTO obligations that remain 
unsolved, such as how WTO Members could best incentivize the use of renewable energy by domestic 
producers without violating their WTO obligations. Both explanations could apply. Either way, 
additional Panel and AB’s elucidation of relevant WTO obligations in US –Renewable Energy Sector 
will be very welcome.
 
 
More traditional trade issues are also at play in this dispute. India’s argument that it should be able 
to invoke a “short supply” Article XX exception to justify a domestic content restriction simply on the 
basis of an “inadequate” domestic manufacturing capacity is quite problematic. The AB also soundly 
rejected India’s contention that a government can discriminate against foreign firms in upstream 
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industries that supply inputs into a public procurement project. Ruling in India’s favor would have 
opened many opportunities for governments to force a myriad of suppliers to buy domestically as long 
as the government purchased the final good.  
India’s desire to use policy to address critical social goals such as poverty reduction, expansion of 
access to electricity, reducing greenhouse gases, and encouraging a domestic solar energy 
manufacturing sector is of course understandable. But effective policy development usually means 
prioritizing goals and understanding interactions among those objectives. In this context, this would 
mean recognizing that actions such as banning foreign sourcing of solar cells and modules can 
seriously undercut other important policy aims. One might for example argue that spreading electricity 
access to rural populations and adopting solar energy in India, with its abundant sunshine, would be 
better served by subsidizing installation of solar panels from any source. In addition, the jobs and 
value-added associated with installation and maintenance of solar energy capacity likely are greater 
than the domestic production of solar cells themselves, a point noted in a 2012 National Resources 
Defense Council study (NRDC, 2012) on India’s national solar project. In short, India may need to 
evaluate whether achieving one goal (increasing employment for a narrow range of manufacturing 
activities) may undercut what the Indian government may deem even more important (electrification 
of rural areas, reducing poverty, and combating climate change).  
Even if India deems the expansion of solar energy manufacturing to be a critical long-term 
domestic policy goal, the WTO system relies on non-discrimination-unless there are compelling 
reasons to relax this core obligation. India simply did not make a convincing argument that domestic 
content rules for an upstream input were justified in this case. The Appellate Body was quite correct in 
rejecting its claims.  
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Figure 2: Indian Photovoltaic Imports  
from USA  
(HS 854140) 
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Figure 3: Crystalline Photovoltaic Module Spot 
Prices 
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